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Abstract: Political scientists use experiments to test the predictions of game-theoretic models. In 
a typical experiment, each subject makes choices that determine her own earnings and the 
earnings of other subjects, with payments corresponding to the utility payoffs of a theoretical 
game. But social preferences distort the correspondence between a subject’s cash earnings and 
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her subjective utility, and since social preferences vary, anonymously matched subjects cannot 
know their opponents’ preferences between outcomes, turning many laboratory tasks into games 
of incomplete information. We reduce the distortion of social preferences by pitting subjects 
against algorithmic agents (“Nashbots”). Across 11 experimental tasks, subjects facing human 
opponents played rationally only 36% of the time, but those facing algorithmic agents did so 
60% of the time. We conclude that experimentalists have underestimated the economic 
rationality of laboratory subjects by designing tasks that are poor analogies to the games they 
purport to test. 
Laboratory experiments in political science and economics have provided tremendous insight 
into human decision-making, and experimental results often call into question rational-choice 
theories. For example, experiments have shown that subjects use focal points rather than mixed-
strategy equilibria when coordinating (Schelling 1960) and avoid losses in ways that violate 
expected utility theory (Allais 1953; Kahneman and Tversky 1979). Experiments play an 
increasingly important role in political science because they provide important evidence of 
causal effects, and can support or undermine the predictions of formal models. Many 
experiments confirm theoretical predictions, but some have contradicted prominent theories of 
resource management (Ostrom, Walker, and Gardner 1992), voting (Forsythe et al. 1996), 
committee decision-making (Guarnaschelli, McKelvey, and Palfrey 2000), legislative bargaining 
(Diermeier and Morton 2005), and international conflict (Tingley and Walter 2011; Quek 2016). 
Camerer (1997) argues that these contradictions should lead us to “think of plausible 
explanations for [observed behavior] and extend formal game theory to incorporate these 
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explanations.” But the problem with using experimental results to extend theory is that there are 
two possible reasons that those results might diverge from theoretical predictions. On one hand, 
game theory may lack predictive validity, in which case an extension is required. On the other 
hand, a laboratory task may lack construct validity—that is, it may not have the same players, 
actions, payoffs, or information as the theoretical model it is designed to test—in which case its 
results should not be used to modify or extend theory. 
Perhaps the most common way laboratory tasks fail as analogies to theoretical games is 
in the construction of payoffs. Experimenters typically use cash payments (or lotteries) to 
represent the utility payoffs of a theoretical game, and ask subjects to make choices that 
determine their own earnings and the earnings of others. The problem with this method is that the 
utility payoffs in a game represent a complete accounting of all a player’s motivations, whereas 
cash payments are not the only thing that motivates a laboratory subject—no matter how much 
money is on the line (Darai and Grätz 2010). When making choices that affect other people, most 
subjects have “social preferences” like the desire for fairness or generosity, and these social 
preferences change the payoff structure of the game.  Moreover, since humans vary in their 1
social preferences, subjects cannot know their anonymous partners’ payoffs with certainty, which 
in turn changes the information structure of the game. 
We argue that the use of algorithmic opponents can mitigate the distorting effect of social 
preferences on the payoffs and information of experimental tasks. We pit human subjects against 
“Nashbots”—algorithmic agents programmed to employ equilibrium strategies—and this 
 Subjects may also have preferences regarding cognitive effort, risk-taking, and compliance with 1
perceived experimenter expectations. We take a number of measures to minimize these 
confounds in our experiments. (See Appendix A.)
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reduces the distortion of social preferences in two ways. First, subjects should not be concerned 
about their opponents’ earnings, since algorithms cannot actually own or use money. Second, 
subjects should not believe that there is any possibility that their opponents hold social 
preferences, since we explain clearly how the Nashbots maximize their own earnings and expect 
human players to do the same. Our experiments show that pitting subjects against algorithmic 
opponents increases by 66% the frequency with which their behavior matches game-theoretic 
predictions. 
1. Using experiments to test rational-choice theory 
Since game theory purports to model human behavior (Rasmusen 2006; Myerson 2013), 
it should be subject to experimental tests. Indeed, testing theory is one of the chief roles of 
experiments in political science (Roth 1995; Druckman et al. 2006; Palfrey 2008). Fiorina and 
Plott (1978) offered one of the first tests of game-theoretic predictions in their experimental 
study of decision-making under majority rule. Their finding—that game-theoretic models 
outperformed sociological theories of behavior—helped popularize the rational-choice paradigm. 
Experiments that test formal theories pose this question: to what degree do individuals 
engage in the sophisticated, self-interested, strategic reasoning prescribed by game-theoretic 
solution concepts? To answer this question, we must observe individuals’ behavior in an 
environment in which we perfectly understand the defining features of the game: players, 
actions, payoffs, and information (Rasmusen 2006). The greatest challenge in creating such an 
environment is that humans are influenced by a multitude of motivations and accounting for 
them is a daunting task. Moreover, to evaluate subjects’ economic rationality, the experimenter 
must know precisely what information they have about the motivations of other players. 
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In game theory, predicting behavior is simplified by the assumption of utility payoffs that 
are both all-encompassing and (in games of complete information) common knowledge. A 
player’s utility payoffs perfectly summarize his subjective experience of relative satisfaction with 
the various outcomes of a game. By definition, a player prefers any outcome of higher utility to 
any outcome of lower utility; if a player faces a decision that determines the outcome of a game 
and understands the consequences of that decision, then whatever choice he makes must be the 
choice of highest utility to him.   2
If we design an experimental representation of the Ultimatum Game (UG) using oatmeal 
cookies as our operationalization of utility, then subjects who don’t like oatmeal cookies aren’t 
actually playing an UG. Similarly, in the cash-incented UG with a human opponent, subjects 
who value fairness over making a few extra bucks aren’t playing an UG. Moreover, subjects who 
do like oatmeal cookies or prefer to maximize dollars but don’t know whether their opponents 
have the same preferences are playing a game of incomplete information, so even these subjects 
aren’t playing an UG. 
When an experimenter simply translates utility into dollars, he sidesteps his responsibility 
to ascertain his subjects’ preferences among all the possible outcomes of a task. For example, 
Frechette et al. (2000) use cash payments to represent the utility payoffs of Baron and Ferejohn’s 
(1989) bargaining model of legislative equilibrium—essentially an iterated, multiplayer UG. 
They conclude “proposers consistently fail to allocate themselves anything close to what the 
 This is even true if the player’s decision requires him to burn cash. If a subject chooses to 2
thwart his own advantage in an existentialist attempt to disprove rational egoism, the only flaw 
with the model is this: it fails to account for the fact that the utility of disproving rational egoism 
exceeds the utility of the cash he burns.
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theory predicts.” But a proposer in their cash-incentivized task may actually prefer taking less, 
because she values fairness or generosity; or she may believe that taking less will increase her 
expected cash payment, because her opponent might reject a low offer. (This belief is justified; in 
our experiments, an ultimatum proposer’s expected earnings were 70% higher when he offered 
$2 rather than $1.) The experimental task Frechette et al. devised differs in both payoffs and 
information from Baron and Ferejohn’s model, so it cannot test that model.  3
Unfortunately, it is difficult to identify the effect of subjects’ social preferences on their 
subjective utility. Psychologists have long understood that different individuals view the interests 
of others with greater or lesser concern (Van Lange 1999), and small changes in the framing of a 
task strongly influence subjects’ apparent social preferences (Bardsley 2008; Lazear et al. 2012). 
Because social preferences and beliefs are so difficult to measure, the best way to 
replicate the payoffs and information of a theoretical game in the lab is to remove social 
considerations entirely. To do this, we replace subjects’ human opponents—towards whom they 
may feel sympathy or antipathy—with computer algorithms that cannot receive any actual 
money but are programmed to maximize their utility functions. Because humans are indifferent 
to the objectives of computer algorithms, utility when interacting with an algorithm should be 
free from social motives. That is, subjects should respond to their own financial incentives (a 
 A colleague posed this concern: “if we are interested in how humans play a game against each 3
other, if the models we use cannot predict that, they need to be changed.” But most political 
scientists aren’t interested in how undergraduates distribute cash among their peers—they’re 
interested in statecraft and conflict. Theorists devise games to model these problems, and if a 
subject faces the same decision described by the model, it doesn’t matter if his opponent is 
human. After all, many rational-choice models have non-human players like states or parties. 
And remember, if a subject has different payoffs or information than those in the model, he is 
playing a different game. No solution concept, applied to one game, can be expected to predict 
behavior in another game.
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dollar equivalent of the theoretical payoffs), taking into account their opponents’ likely actions 
but without sympathy for their plight. Subjects pitted against Nashbots are informed that on each 
task, the algorithm is designed to follow exactly one objective: maximizing its earnings for that 
single task, independent of any other task, while assuming that the subject will do the same. 
2. Method 
We designed an experiment to evaluate the construct validity of cash exchange between 
humans as a measurement of utility, and identify the proportion of subjects whose deviations 
from equilibrium behavior can be explained by the failure to account for social preferences. Of 
course, social preferences cannot explain all deviation from equilibrium; many strategic 
problems are simply too complex for untrained subjects to be able or willing to solve in the 
laboratory.  For this reason we present our subjects with simple tasks for which—absent social 4
preferences—they are likely capable of finding an equilibrium. (We include paid quizzes on the 
instructions. Subjects answer correctly more than 90% of the time.) Our analytic strategy is to 
compare the behavior of subjects interacting with humans to the behavior of those interacting 
with algorithmic agents.   5
In our experiment, 230 subjects participated in economic-exchange tasks—190 matched 
with human players sitting in another room, and 40 matched with algorithms running on a 
 Ostrom et al. (1992), for example, report that even after subjects discussed their task for 10 4
minutes in groups of eight, “no group found the optimal solution.”
 Johnson et al. (2002) used a similar method to argue that subjects do not use subgame-perfect 5
equilibrium strategies, but their findings do not shed much light on the proportion of subjects 
whose deviations from equilibrium behavior can be explained by social preferences, for four 
reasons: they only studied one task, they picked a very difficult task, their computer treatment 
was confounded by learning, and they only report means, which are theoretically uninformative. 
As a result, their results are mostly uninformative in regard to this study.
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computer in another room. We report on 11 experimental tasks set within five strategic scenarios. 
Each scenario served as an analogy to a theoretical game. Some scenarios had a second stage in 
which the subject would be informed of his opponent’s choice before choosing an action. This 
paper excludes second stages (to preclude learning effects) and tasks for which there is no 
deterministic game-theoretic prediction (e.g. games with mixed-strategy equilibria). 
In each of the following scenarios, subjects are paired with partners in another room—
either a human or computer. Human opponents are randomly reassigned after each activity, and 
algorithmic agents retain no memory of previous activities. To measure beliefs, we pay subjects 
to predict their opponents’ choices and allow them to bet on the accuracy of their predictions. 
Below in parentheses, we provide the relevant solution concept and its prediction. See 
Appendices for the full protocols, handouts, and game solutions. 
1. Donation: The subject and her partner both begin with $5; the subject may transfer any 
amount of her $5 to the partner; the subject loses her transfer and her partner receives 
quadruple this amount. (Payoff maximization: transfer $0.) 
2. Prisoner’s Dilemma: The subject chooses whether to take $2 for himself at a cost of $3 to 
his partner. His partner faces the same choice. (Dominant strategy: take $2.) 
3. Ultimatum (Stage 1): The subject splits $10 between herself and her partner. If the partner 
accepts the subject’s split, both parties receive the amounts chosen by the subject. If the 
partner rejects, the $10 is lost. (Subgame perfect Nash equilibrium strategy: offer $1.) 
4. Sequential Chicken (Stage 1): The subject chooses STOP or GO; his partner is informed 
of his choice, then chooses STOP or GO. If both pick STOP, both earn $4; if both pick GO 
 !8
both earn nothing; if one picks STOP and the other GO, they earn $3 and $5 respectively. 
(Subgame perfect Nash equilibrium strategy: GO.) 
5. Trust (Stage 1): The subject and her partner both begin with $5; the subject may transfer 
any amount of her $5 to her partner; the subject loses her transfer and her partner receives 
triple this amount. The partner will find out how much he received from the subject, and 
may return any amount to the subject. (Nash equilibrium strategy: transfer $0.) 
5.1. Trust Predictions: Subjects are asked to predict opponents’ choices. Correct 
predictions earn $3, incorrect $0. T1 is the subject who acts first, choosing an 
amount to transfer; T2 is the one who acts second, choosing an amount to return. 
(Nash strategy for all three tasks: $0.) 
A. T2 indicates the amount he predicts T1 will transfer. 
B. T1 predicts the amount T2 predicts T1 will transfer. 
C. T2 predicts T1’s prediction of the amount T2 predicts T1 will transfer.  
5.2. Trust Confidence Bets: Subjects may bet on the accuracy of their predictions. If 
they bet, they earn $2 if they were correct and lose $1 if incorrect. If they do not bet, 
they earn $0. (Nash strategy for all three tasks: having chosen $0 in the relevant 
Prediction, place bet.) 
A. T2 bets on the accuracy of his response to (5.1.A).  
B. T1 bets on the accuracy of his response to (5.1.B).  
C. T2 bets on the accuracy of his response to (5.1.C).  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4. Results 
Figure 1 shows that as expected, across all 11 tasks, subjects were more likely to follow 
game-theoretic predictions when playing against algorithmic agents. For nine tasks, the 
difference is statistically significant. Figure 2 shows the proportion of subjects making 
equilibrium choices in the two treatment conditions. On average, subjects make equilibrium 
choices 60% of the time when faced with algorithmic opponents, but only 36% of the time with 
human opponents. Removing social preferences increases by 66% the probability that a subject 
will act in accordance with the theory’s predictions. The take-away point is that against 
Nashbots, subjects’ behavior confirms game-theoretic predictions a majority of the time; against 
human opponents, their behavior contradicts those predictions a majority of the time. 
[Figures 1 & 2] 
The results support our claim that using algorithmic opponents strengthens the 
relationship between cash payments and utility. The Donation and Prisoner’s Dilemma tasks test 
whether a subject is willing to maximize her dollar earnings at the expense of her opponents; the 
subject can choose unilaterally between outcomes, so if she doesn’t choose to maximize her cash 
payment, either she doesn’t understand the task or her payoffs diverge from the cash incentives. 
Thus, every subject who understands the task and values the outcomes as the model describes 
will choose the cash-maximizing outcome. When subjects are matched with Nashbots instead of 
humans, the proportions of subjects who violate theoretical predictions decrease by 43% and 
64%, respectively. 
The results also support our claim that using algorithmic opponents improves the 
relationship between experimental and theoretical information. Trust Prediction tasks A, B, and 
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C test whether a subject can predict his opponent’s behavior based on the information he has 
about that opponent’s incentive structure. When subjects are matched with Nashbots, the 
proportions of subjects who violate theoretical predictions decrease by 59%, 47%, and 55%, 
respectively. (Subjects were also more than twice as likely to make correct predictions in each of 
these three tasks.) 
The remaining tasks are second-order consequences of the preferences and beliefs 
discussed above. If a subject believes her opponent will reliably maximize payoffs in the Trust 
Game, she should be willing to bet on her prediction (Trust Confidence Bets A, B, and C). If a 
subject believes her opponent will maximize payoffs and she prefers to maximize her own 
payoffs, she will play equilibrium strategies in stage one of the two-stage games (Ultimatum, 
Sequential Chicken, and Trust). The data show a decrease in non-equilibrium choices across all 
six tasks. The differences for Trust Confidence Bets A and B are significant, but the difference 
for Bet C is barely insignificant (p = .06). The differences for stage one of Trust and Ultimatum 
are significant, but the difference for Chicken is insignificant (p = .85). The slightly weaker 
evidence for these tasks, which require second-order reasoning, is not a surprise, since factors 
other than social preferences—such as cognitive limitations—may play a larger role in 
preventing subjects from making equilibrium choices (Simon 1955; Camerer et al. 1993). 
Even without Nashbots, the frequency of equilibrium choices is higher in our 
experiments than in some of the classic papers. In Trust Stage 1, 45% of our subjects made 
equilibrium choices when facing a human opponent; in Berg, Dickhaut, and McCabe (1995) 6% 
did. In Ultimatum Stage 1, 6% of our subjects made equilibrium offers to humans; in Forsythe et 
al. (1994) none did. Given the variety of ways in which two experimental setups might differ, it’s 
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difficult to identify the reasons for these discrepancies. But the fact that our subjects were more 
predisposed to employ equilibrium strategies even against humans makes the magnitude of the 
Nashbots effect especially impressive. 
5. Conclusions 
By ignoring social preferences, experimentalists have significantly underestimated the 
rationality of their subjects. Pitting humans against profit-maximizing algorithms eliminates 
social preferences and makes laboratory tasks better analogies to the games they purport to test, 
and we show that this approach causes a much larger portion of subjects to play as theory 
predicts. We recommend that experimenters employing economic exchange tasks include 
algorithmic opponents, at least as a robustness check, to account for the potential distortions 
caused by social preferences. One avenue for future research is to replicate with algorithmic 
opponents experiments that have been used to confirm or contradict formal theories of politics. 
Just as experimenters have a responsibility to identify precisely the game that their 
subjects are playing, theorists have a responsibility to address the experimental evidence that 
social preferences distort utility functions. Many subjects do not value their financial self-interest 
enough for cash payments to induce an experimenter’s intended preference ordering. And many 
subjects are not confident enough in the self-interest of others for a task with cash payments to 
induce the intended beliefs. In light of these experimental findings, what kinds of incentives can 
theorists convincingly claim are important enough to reliably induce preferences and beliefs? Or 
for what kinds of individuals is an incentive sufficient to induce preferences and beliefs? One of 
the most important tasks for a theorist is to specify the domain of his theory. Theorists attempting 
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to model politics need to ensure that their formal models have well specified and clearly justified 
domains. 
Aldrich and Lupia (2011) have called for “research agendas that integrate experimental 
and formal modeling pursuits” to “improve the applicability and relevance of formal models.” 
We agree, but when testing formal models, experimentalists must ensure that the tasks they 
design match the models they claim to test. Experiments showing altruism and envy may shed 
light on human psychology, but when experimenters cannot confidently identify players’ 
preferences over the outcomes and beliefs about the other players’ preferences and beliefs, they 
shed no light on formal theory. We believe that matching human subjects with algorithms is not 
just a useful manipulation for uncovering social preferences; it is the correct way to translate 
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Figure 1. Subjects more often comport with theoretical expectations under the Algorithmic-
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